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I.  The Concept of Separation of Powers 
 
 The concept of separation of powers in state administration is one of 
the key characteristics of a modern constitutional state. This concept is a 
result of a long experience that all powers which were previously concentrated 
on a King or a Queen, especially in countries applying theocracy, led to unrest 
and abuse of authority. It was John Locke who came up with the idea about 
the necessity to divide state power into 3 (three) functions, namely legislative, 
executive, and federative. Based on John Locke’s idea, Montesquieu in his 
book published in 1748, “L’Esprit des Lois” (The Spirit of Laws), divided state 
power into 3 (three) branches, namely legislative, executive and judicial 
powers.  
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 The idea of the separation of power developed fast and was adjusted 
to the developments in each country. van Vollenhoven from The Netherlands, 
for example, divided power into 4 (four) functions, namely regeling 
(legislature), bestuur (executive government), rechtspraak (judiciary), and 
politie (social order). Therefore, Montesquieu’s idea is not absolutely 
applicable in the same manner in every state. Moreover, this concept 
emerged for the first time more than 250 years ago and it certainly could not 
possibly anticipate the current developments in the modern state 
administration system. However, the idea conveyed by John Locke or 
Montesquieu can still be regarded as an initial doctrine in the concept of 
separation of powers, which subsequently developed into division of powers 
and distribution of powers, as it is impossible to make a rigid separation of the 
three branches of power. Even though those branches have different powers 
and do not intervene with each other, they are interconnected for the 
functioning of the state administration by maintaining the mechanism of 
checks and balances.  
 
 In relation to the application of the separation of powers, The 1945 
Constitution, prior to its amendments, actually confirmed the adoption of the 
constitutional state concept (rechtsstaat) by the Republic of Indonesia. 
However, Indonesia did not fully adopt the concept since the beginning, 
because in reality the provisions set forth in the Constitution were made 
based on Indonesia’s domestic needs. This is reflected in the authority of the 
President to make laws, in addition to his position as the head of government 
and the head of state. Even though he requires the approval of the Parliament 
(DPR) for making laws, the constitutional norm setting forth the authority of 
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the President to make law has led to the concentration of powers on the 
President (executive heavy) in the history of Indonesian state administration. 
The absence of mechanism for balancing and monitoring the law-making 
authority through the process of judicial review at the time made such 
concentration even more obvious. 
 
All components of the Indonesian nation realized the flaws in the 
constitutional statement about the separation of powers in the history of 
Indonesian state administration, and they found a momentum of change in the 
reform era in 1998. Therefore, one of the changes agreed in the formulation of 
the amendments to the 1945 Constitution as one of the reform agenda items, 
was to purify the presidential system, including the confirmation of the 
principle of separation of powers as one of the components of the presidential 
system. In the context of Indonesian state administration system following the 
amendments to the Constitution in 1999 -2002, the concept of separation of 
powers is applied by referring to the following principles: First, the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers have different functions, namely to make laws, 
to implement laws and to administer courts in order to enforce laws and 
justice, respectively. Second, it is not allowed to hold concurrent positions in 
those three branches of power. Third, none of these institutions can intervene 
in the implementation of their respective functions. Fourth, the principle of 
checks and balances prevails among the branches of power. Fifth, the 
branches have equal positions with coordinative function rather than 
subordinative function. 
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Regardless of all of the foregoing, it has to be noted that the idea to 
purify the presidential system cannot be implemented with certainty because 
there is no way of ascertaining the system is pure. Every state has a theory 
that it has developed, but none of them can be regarded as pure, because in 
reality each state has different domestic values. 
 
II.  Checks and Balances Mechanism 
 
The checks and balances mechanism is one of the principles that 
needs to be strengthened in Indonesia’s state administration system. The idea 
of checks and balances has actually been brought up in public debates. The 
idea of judicial review, for example, already existed during the formulation of 
the 1945 Constitution prior to Indonesian independence.  It was first conveyed 
by one of the founding fathers, Moh. Yamin. The idea of judicial review 
continued to present, especially among academicians, but it had never been 
successfully legally institutionalized. Therefore, prior to the amendments to 
the Constitution, Indonesian judicial body did not have the authority to conduct 
constitutional review. At that time, judicial review of laws could only be 
conducted by the legislative body through the mechanism of legislative review 
or political review, whereas the real power of this body used to be strongly 
dominated by the President. 
 
One of the efforts to strengthen the checks and balances mechanism 
between the judicial and legislative powers has been the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court which has the authority to conduct judicial review of laws 
against the 1945 Constitution, both materially and formally, whereas the 
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Supreme Court has the authority to conduct judicial review of regulations 
against laws and regulations of a higher rank in the hierarchy. 
 
 In addition to the authority to conduct judicial review of laws against the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court has other authorities as well that are 
closely related to the application of the checks and balances mechanism, 
namely to decide in disputes of authorities between state institutions the 
authorities of which are granted under the 1945 Constitution, to decide upon 
the dissolution of political parties, and to decide upon electoral disputes. The 
Indonesian Constitutional Court also has the obligation to decide upon the 
opinion of the Parliament (DPR) about alleged violations of the 1945 
Constitution committed by the President and/or Vice President or better 
known as impeachment. Considering such highly important authorities, 
especially those related to its function in the implementation of the checks and 
balances mechanism, the Indonesian Constitutional Court is certainly not free 
from the oversight by other branches of power, namely the legislative and the 
executive.  
 
Each state puts Constitutional Court in a different position within their 
state administration system and national political map. Sometimes, the 
Constitutional Court is not wanted and its work is hampered in such a way 
that it is unable to perform its functions maximally. For example, as Justice 
Svetlana Sydikova of the Constitutional Court of Kyrgyztan stated in the 6th 
Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges 2009 in Mongolia, the 
Constitutional Court and the legislative body of Kyrgyzstan do not always 
have a good relationship. For almost more than two years, the Constitutional 
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Court of Kyrgyzstan had been unable to perform its activities because the 
number of justices never met the quorum required to make decisions. This 
was due to an intentional procrastination in the nomination of new justices to 
replace retiring justices by the President. 
 
Based on the aforementioned illustration, we come to the conclusion 
that the dependence and independence of a Constitutional Court in the 
context of the separation of powers are likely to affect to a great extent the 
performance and functions of the Constitutional Court in the implementation of 
the checks and balances mechanism.  
 
III.  The Independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
 
 The independence of the Constitutional Court is guaranteed by the 
Constitution as set forth in Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which reads as 
follows: “The judicial power shall be independent and shall posses the power 
to organize the judicature in order to enforce law and justice”. The 
aforementioned provision is reaffirmed in Article 2 of the Constitutional Court 
Law which reads as follows, ”Constitutional Court is a state institution which 
executes independent judiciary functions to hold trials in order to enforce law 
and justice”. This means that there shall be no intervention in any form or in 
any manner whatsoever against the Constitutional Court by any branch of 
power. 
 
 Such written provisions certainly do not guarantee that a state 
institution is automatically independent. Therefore, since its establishment in 
2003 the Indonesian Constitutional Court has been developing and working 
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not only based on the principle of independence, but also based on the 
principles of impartiality, accountability and transparency. Those principles 
can be related to the Constitutional Court as an institution and to the Justices 
and its employees with the organizational systems running in it. 
 
 It is appropriate to say that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has 
given an enormous contribution to the development of constitutionalism, 
democracy, and the spirit of judicial reform in Indonesia. Generally speaking, 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court has also earned public trust because it is 
deemed to have developed its system and working procedures in an 
appropriate manner. Decisions made by the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
have always been seen as being able to solve legal and constitutional issues. 
Due to its relatively strong legitimation, every Decision of the Constitutional 
Court is accepted as a final and binding decision by the government, the 
parliament, state institutions, the people as well as non-governmental 
organizations. Thus far, none of the Decisions of Indonesian Constitutional 
Court has been disregarded, either decisions on judicial review of laws or 
decisions on electoral disputes. Even if some of the decisions are considered 
controversial by the public, the debates usually stop at the academic level and 
do not go further to political issues. If a decision of the Constitutional Court 
has not been implemented, the general public and the press usually put 
concerted strong pressure on the institution that has the obligation to 
implement the decision. This means that the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court are respected not only by all parties concerned, but they are also 
implemented by the relevant institutions. 
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 The Constitutional Court Law also grants the freedom to the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court to further regulate the matters required for the 
uninterrupted implementation of its duties and authorities. Therefore, every 
development in the implementation of the duties and authorities of the 
Constitutional Court requiring regulations, the Court makes its own regulations 
through judicial practices and decisions, or in the form of Constitutional Court 
Regulations, so that it does not depend on other branches of power. 
 
 The Constitutional Court provides for its own budget and financial 
matters required for implementing its duties and authorities, internally in 
accordance with the state financial capacity, even though it has to obtain the 
approval of the Parliament which has the budgeting function. Thus far, there 
has never been any substantial objection from the Parliament to the draft 
budget of the Constitutional Court, because the application and reporting of 
the Court’s finance have always been conducted in a transparent and 
accountable manner. This is at least proved by the granting of the best 
opinion on the results of audits by the Audit Board (BPK) for four consecutive 
years. 
 
 The Constitutional Court is also granted full authority to provide for and 
plan the recruitment of employees and its organizational management, insofar 
as it is in line with applicable laws and regulations. Potential intervention and 
interference by external parties can thus be prevented.  
 
IV.  The Independence of Constitutional Justices  
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The Indonesian Constitutional Court consists of 9 (nine) justices. 3 
(three) of them are nominated by the President, the other 3 (three) are 
nominated by the Parliament and the remaining 3 (three) are nominated by 
the Supreme Court. Such recruitment mechanism is a materialization of the 
efforts to create checks and balances function to be implemented by the 
Constitutional Court. Even though they are selected by 3 (three) different 
branches of power, the Constitutional Justices must work independently in 
order to remain free from the influence or intervention by any branch of power. 
Once they are appointed as Constitutional Justices as the representation of 
the three different branches of power, they must be detached from the 
subjective interest of the institution selecting them and must dedicate all of 
their energy, efforts and thoughts for the Constitutional Court. 
 
In order to maintain the independence of Constitutional Justices, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court has also formulated the Constitutional Justice 
Code of Ethics. The Code of Ethics has been made with reference to the 
principles set out in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, namely the 
principles of independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, 
competence and diligence, as well as implementation. By adhering to the 
Code of Ethics, Constitutional Justices are able to remain unaffected by any 
influence or intervention by any party in performing their duties, including the 
public opinion or mass media reports. If a Constitutional Justice violates the 
Code of Ethics, the Constitutional Court will internally form an Honorary 
Council of the Constitutional Court for conducting examinations and imposing 
sanctions, if necessary, merely for maintaining independence, impartiality and 
accountability of the Constitutional Court to the public. In order to strengthen 
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the independence of the Constitutional Court, the Parliament (DPR) is 
currently discussing the most appropriate format for taking part in overseeing 
the conduct of Constitutional Justices by other independent institutions. 
 
Endeavors for creating independence of Constitutional Justices of 
course start as early as the selection process for recruitment by providing the 
broadest opportunity for public participation to the greatest possible extent. 
The main requirement for becoming a Constitutional Justice in Indonesia is 
possessing impeccable integrity and personality, being fair, and being a 
statesman with a good mastery of the constitution and state administration. In 
this case, being a good statesman is a very important and essential 
prerequisite because the only public office in Indonesia requiring 
statesmanship is the position of Constitutional Justice, while it is not required 
for candidates for President, Minister or Member of the Parliament. The 
Constitutional Court holds the view that statesman must be construed as a 
person who places the interest of the state above his or her personal interest 
or the interest of his or her group, so that he or she must be independent and 
impartial by prioritizing the norms of the constitution, law and justice. 
 
Other requirements to become a Constitutional Justice include the 
following: having Indonesian nationality, having educational background in 
law, having never been imposed with the criminal sanction of imprisonment 
for 5 (five) years based on a final court decision, not being declared bankrupt, 
having professional experience in the field of law for at least 10 (ten) years. In 
addition to being independent, Constitutional Justices are also required to be 
impartial and for that reason Constitutional Justices are prohibited from 
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holding other concurrent positions as public officials, members of political 
party, entrepreneurs, advocates or civil servants. The minimum age for 
becoming Constitutional Justice is 40 (forty) years, with the consideration that 
the person concerned has adequate experience in the field of law and state 
administration in examining, trying and adjudicating in constitutional cases. 
 
In an effort to avoid judicial corruption due to the non-fulfillment of the 
needs of Justices, the protocolar position and financial rights of Constitutional 
Justices are treated in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations 
applicable for state officials. Constitutional Justices also have the right of 
immunity, namely that they can only be subject to politional action upon the 
order of the Attorney General after obtaining the approval of the President, 
except in certain circumstances, such as being caught in the act of committing 
a crime. 
 
One of the most debated subjects in discussions regarding the 
independence of Constitutional Justices is related to the term of office, namely 
whether it should be only for a certain period of time, up to reaching 
retirement age, or for life. In Indonesia, the provision on the term of office of 
Constitutional Justices adopts a combined mechanism, namely it is subject to 
a limit of 5 (five) years and potential reappointment for another subsequent 1 
(one) term of office, or upon reaching the age of 67 years. Accordingly, it is 
expected that the regeneration and refreshment of the reasoning of 
Constitutional Justices will be able to keep up with the current changes and 
developments in state administration. 
 
V.  Operating Procedures of the Court 
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 In addition to the institutional organization and the position of 
Constitutional Justices within the same, the independence of the 
Constitutional Court is also reflected in the development of ideas and 
schemes in handling cases in the implementation of its authorities. In handling 
cases which fall under its competence, the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
does not consider whether the case is filed by a political majority or a political 
minority. The mechanism for the submission of petition for judicial review in 
Indonesia does not set forth any minimum pre-requisite in the form of 
approval from the parliament or other judicial bodies as applied by some 
states. Therefore, minority groups striving for their interests or even an 
individual citizen have equal rights before the Constitutional Court without 
having to be concerned about any effort by the majority group to influence the 
independence of Constitutional Justices. Many petitions granted by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court were submitted by minority groups.   
 
 According to the system applied in Indonesia, constitutional review is 
conducted after its ratification by the Parliament, rather than the other way 
round, as is the case, for instance, with the system applied in France, which is 
more commonly known as judicial preview. Therefore, the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court does not interfere with matters related to the formation of 
laws, which is the authority of the Parliament. Similarly, when asked for 
opinion, suggestion or recommendation by the Parliament, the Constitutional 
Court does not give any comment or response regarding any Law which is still 
in the process of being formulated. The purpose of this is to avoid conflict of 
interest when the Constitutional Court conducts a constitutionality review of a 
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law, for which the Court is requested by the Parliament to give its opinion, 
suggestion or recommendation. By doing so, the institutional relationship 
between the Constitutional Court and the Parliament is maintained while 
keeping a distance in accordance with their respective functions, although this 
does not mean that they must always be in constant disagreement with each 
other. 
 
 Hans Kelsen’s doctrine, the Constitutional Court has the function of a 
negative legislator because it has the authority to delete or remove any article, 
paragraph or other provisions in a law which is contradictory to the 1945 
Constitution, has also been widely accepted by the Indonesian general public, 
including the Parliament which has the function of a positive legislator. There 
are still some ongoing debates among academicians whether or not the 
Constitutional Court has the authority to make a decision which exceeds the 
petition, or commonly known as ultra petitia. In the Constitutional Court’s view, 
in certain circumstances and conditions ultra petita should be allowed, 
because in examining constitutional cases closely related to the 
developments of law, politics, democracy, and state administration, the 
Constitutional Court cannot be bound by the existing conditions. In fact, it has 
become a usual practice for the Indonesian Constitutional Court in its 
decisions not refer merely to procedural justice, but also to substantive justice, 
hence the Constitutional Court can go beyond laws and regulations that 
hamper the realization of justice, legal certainty and usefulness. 
 
 One of the proofs of the independence of every Justice of the 
Constitutional Court in Indonesia is the opportunity to give either concurring 
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opinion or dissenting opinion in the making of any decision. A Panel of 
Justices usually holds a Deliberation Meeting of Justices in order to discuss 
the case at hand behind closed doors. Each Constitutional Justice gives his or 
her legal opinion which is presented, discussed and subjected to scientific 
debate. If in the making of a decision on a certain case one of the Justices 
insists on his or her own opinion which is different from that of the majority of 
Justices, he or she is allowed to state his or her reasoning in the Decision in a 
special section provided specifically for concurring opinion or dissenting 
opinion.  
 
However, after once a decision is passed, none of the Constitutional 
Justice are allowed to engage in debate regarding the official decision passed 
by the Constitutional Court, including the Justices who conveyed either 
concurring opinion or dissenting opinion. In fact, Constitutional Justices are 
strictly prohibited from discussing a case in their office or at other places. 
Discussions concerning a case are only allowed to be conducted in the 
Deliberation Chamber officially used for that purpose, so that the 
independence of Justices can be internally maintained because none of them 
will try to influence the other. 
 
VI.  Transparency of the Court 
 
 Another equally important matter in strengthening the independence 
and legitimation of the Constitutional Court and Constitutional Justices is the 
hearing process which is implemented transparently and it is open to the 
general public and the press. Not a single legal fact or information can be 
concealed or manipulated, because the entire process is recorded in audio 
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and visual recordings, or minutes. In addition to providing facilities and the 
opportunity to the greatest possible extent to the public and the press, the 
Constitutional Court also has 34 video conference networks placed at law 
schools in all provinces in Indonesia as well as video streaming facility 
through its website, enabling people in the country and abroad who cannot 
attend a Court hearing, which is not broadcast by television stations, to follow 
the hearing live at their respective locations.  
 
Moreover, the text of a decision being read out by the Constitutional 
Justices is displayed on a big screen using computer technology, enabling 
people present in the Court session to read the decision being read out in 
turns by the Constitutional Justices. Following the pronouncement of a 
decision, the full and complete text of the decision is immediately provided to 
the parties to the case in hard copies, while a softcopy of the decision 
concerned is immediately uploaded to the Court’s Official Website within not 
more than 15 minutes after the decision has been read out. The Constitutional 
Court also publishes some of the important decisions in national newspapers 
and magazines on the following day after its pronouncement. Accordingly, not 
a single state official or common citizen has the opportunity to modify the 
contents of a decision or claim that they do not know the decision and use it 
as a reason for not implementing it. 
 
In addition, in order not to obstruct justice seekers from all economic 
levels, people intending to file a petition with the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court both offline or online are not charged any fee or in other words it is free 
of charge. The use of the video conference facility, request for court transcript 
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in the form of audio or visual recordings, as well as texts are also free of 
charge. Therefore, The Constitutional Court in Indonesia has been viewed by 
the people at large as a pioneer in Indonesian judicial reform leading the way 
towards a modern and trustworthy judiciary. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
 The establishment of Constitutional Courts since the beginning of the 
21st century, or of other judicial bodies with similar authorities as 
Constitutional Courts, has been one of the instruments that can potentially 
strengthen the principle of separation of powers in government administration 
in modern constitutional states. The roles and functions implemented by the 
Constitutional Court in safeguarding the orderly implementation of the 
functions and duties of state institutions, especially the executive and 
legislative, are of a highly strategic importance. However, the high level of 
sensitivities related to the Constitutional Court’s authorities are deemed to 
have the potential of hampering the implementation of activities by the other 
branches of power may lead to a reduced level of independence of the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
 Based on the experience of many countries, the independence and 
position of the Constitutional Court demonstrate a great deal of variety. While 
some Constitutional Courts have very strong authorities and independence, 
others have weak authorities and independence. During the existence of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court, its independence or the independence of its 
Constitutional Justices can be regarded as properly maintained. The 
President or the leadership of other state institutions has never attempted to 
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influence any decision to be made by the Constitutional Court. This certainly 
does not occur automatically, but it is rather facilitated by the state 
administration system intentionally designed for such purpose through the 
amendments to the 1945 Constitution and the formulation of the Constitutional 
Court Law.  
 
 In order to create such independence, the Constitutional Court applies 
the principles of good governance, namely independence, transparency and 
accountability, as well as the principles set out in the International Framework 
for Court Excellence (IFCE). In addition to that, the independence of 
Constitutional Justices in Indonesia is also supported by the Code of Ethics 
for Constitutional Justices, which was prepared based on the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct. Equally important has been the very strong 
trust vested by the people and the press in the Constitutional Court, 
particularly with regard to its decisions. For all of the above mentioned 
reasons, every decision made by the Constitutional Court as its main product 
has been respected and implemented with full responsibility by the legislative 
body, the executive body, other state institutions as well as the parties to the 
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